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Abstract
This paper introduces deontic logic of regular actions as a fragment of the modal
 calculus Semantic characterizations of deontic notions for regular actions are given
in terms of conditions on  calculus structures and  calculus formulas capturing this
semantics are constructed
Keywords Deontic Logic of actions Dynamic Logic  calculus nite automatons regular
actions free choice permission contrary to duty norms
  Introduction
This paper proposes a deontic logic for regular actions which are actions built from atomic
actions and the action connectives nondeterministic choice sequence and iteration The
deontic logic notions for nondeterministic choice have been studied extensively in the liter
ature The notions for sequence have been studied much less eg 	
 and for iteration
we are aware of only two studies one by Van der Meyden 	 who studies the notions of
permission and prohibition but does not study obligation and one by Mc Carty 	 who
studies the notions in a logic programming context We think deontic notions for sequence
and iteration are of big relevance to the application of deontic logic to for example the
specication of soft integrity constraints and exception handling in triggering systems for
databases and the specication of fault tolerant systems In all these areas we need the
ability to specify obligation properties of nonatomic processes and properties that express
what must be done if such an obligation is violated Generally we claim that if we pursue
normative logical specications of systems in terms of nonatomic complex actions possibly
in the form of an automaton or program we must have a clear and complete understanding
of deontic notions for sequence and iteration of actions This paper studies these notions in
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the context of the modal  calculus which is a temporal and process logic that due to its
xed point semantics is typically suited for reasoning with iterated actions
In section  we give semantic characterizations of deontic notions for regular actions
in terms of conditions on labeled Kripke structures In section  we introduce the modal
 calculus and the  calculus translation of propositional dynamic logic In section 
 we
dene compositional  calculus expressions that capture the semantic characterizations for
permission and prohibition of section  Obligation can not be characterized in  calculus
formulas in the same way Therefore in section  we dene weakly compositional  calculus
characterizations These characterizations apply to permission prohibition and obligation
For both prohibition and obligation we also very shortly discuss the contrary to duty notions
Section  concludes with a discussion and related and future work
 Semantic characterizations
It seems appropriate rst to say something about the language and interpretation of regular
actions themselves
Denition  Given a set A of atomic action symbols the syntax of a regular action  is
dened as follows
    a j skip j   
 
j 
 
j 

The semantics of regular actions  is dened in terms of sets of traces which are nite
concatenations of atomic actions Atomic actions a constitute elementary traces in them
selves and skip refers to the empty trace The action connective  is associated with union of
traces and  and

with concatenation and union of all nitely repeated selfconcatenations
respectively
In this section we characterize the deontic notions P  F  and O for regular
actions  The intended meaning is respectively Permission to perform  Prohibition to
perform  and Obligation to perform  Meyer 	
 incorporates the deontic realm in his
dynamic logic with the help of a predicate V that denotes violation states Van der Meydens
approach 	 can be seen as assigning violation predicates to possible transitions instead of
states Here we take yet another approach that is conceptually strongly appealing and
that simplies denitions considerably We take atomic propositions P a it is permitted
to perform atomic action a as primitive and introduce valuations of these propositions in
labeled Kripke structures
Denition  Given a nite set A of action symbols a structure S  S  R
A
 is dened as
follows
 S is a nonempty set of possible states
  is a total function A 
S
if s  a we say that P a holds in s
 R
A
is an Aindexed collection of reachability relations over S  S

Until section  where we introduce the modal  
a
calculus we assume a standard modal
action logic over these labeled Kripke structures In these logics a has the interpretation
all performances of action a lead to a state where  holds We need this in the next two
subsections where we discuss how to dene deontic notions for regular actions as conditions
on traces through the structures
  Permission and Prohibition
We start by formulating a rst rough intuition concerning a possible semantics for the notions
of permission and prohibition of regular actions
P   F   it is permitted  forbidden to choose and perform any
trace of 
In an attempt to dene a logic based on this intuition we relate it to the structures of
denition 	 Traces of  are now seen as traces from a state s in a structure S  S  R
A

where the property P  respectively F  is thought to hold We use the following notations
concerning traces  is a trace that interprets the regular action  a trace  of length
n denoted length  n where the length refers to the number of traversed states is a
sequence s

 
 a

 
     s

n 
 a

n 
 s

n
of states s

i
and actions a

i
 Now if we dene F a to be
P a we may try to reformulate the above intuition in terms of properties of individual
traces from a state s in S as
P   in each s

i
on each  P a

i
 holds
F   there is an s

i
on a  for which F a

i

These statements attempt to express the intuitions for permission and prohibition of a regular
action by making explicit the relation of more complex expressions concerning permission and
prohibition with the primitive notion P a But the characterization is incomplete in terms
of modal action logic it leaves room for more than one interpretation as can be seen from
the following example structures
a
a
b
c
a
b
c
P(a)P(a)
P(b)
P(c)
P(b)
P(c)
  free choice   imposed choice
Both structures in their left most state obey the semantic characterization when applied
to P a b c But from a modal point of view the structures are not equivalent since they
do not bisimulate model 	 satises P a 	 aP b 	 P c and model  only satises the
weaker P a 	 aP b 
 P c
If we think of the notion of permission at hand as part of the logic governing an agent
we can say that model 	 corresponds to the logic of an agent that reasons about a future
course of events where it has full control over the choices between actions The agent reasons

if initially I am permitted to perform either ab or ac then after I have done a I can choose
either b or c which implies that after I have performed a I am permitted both b and c
This is exactly what is reected by the formula P a 	 aP b 	 P c We refer to this
interpretation of permission as the total free choice semantics
Model  corresponds to the logic of an agent that reasons about a future course of events
where it has no or only partial control over choices initially it is permitted to perform either
the trace ab or ac but after it has performed a it is only permitted by its environment to
perform either b or c The agent reasons if initially I am permitted to perform either ab or
ac but if I am not permitted to choose between b and c after I have done a then after I have
performed an a I will either be permitted b or c This is exactly what is reected by the
formula P a	aP b
P c We refer to this interpretation of permission as the partially
imposed choice semantics This terminology is inspired by the analogous distinction between
internal and external choice for process algebras The connection between external choice
and partially imposed choice is that the lack of choice of an agent that is performing a trace
can be viewed as choice that is externally forced upon the agent Internal choice corresponds
to free choice because all choices can be thought of as internal to or under control of the
agent Clearly imposed choice permission is a weaker form a permission than free choice
permission
Imposed choice is in general only partial An agent might be deprived of internal choice
only at certain points in the future course of events We can easily outline more extensive
structures in which this is the case
 
 Each of these structures would have a separate modal
formula characterizing it Now if we want to dene the notion P  it seems that we will have
to decide which permission semantics we persue free choice or one of the many possibilities
for partially imposed choice But since we have adopted a trace semantics for regular actions
we implicitly have committed ourselves to a free choice semantics for permission Allready on
the level of action expressions  the trace semantics is just not able to distinguish between the
many dierent possibilities for partially imposed choice

 So given our choice concerning the
action semantics we are led naturally to the total free choice interpretation as the semantics
that makes most sense for regular action expressions  Adopting the total free choice
criterion also corresponds to the semantic choice implicitly made in other systems that dene
deontic notions of regular actions in a modal logic setting 	 	
To characterize the total free choice semantics as a condition on traces through a structure
we will have to look at properties of sets of traces The total free choice semantics imposes
that in any point s in a trace  we are not only permitted to do the next action in the
trace  but we are also permitted to do an action that is the next action in a trace 
 

with the same prex as  In the following a prex pre
i
 of a trace  with length  n
is a trace s

 
 a

 
     s

i 
 a

i 
 s

i
 with i  n
Denition  Semantic characterization of the notions P  and F  both in words and
in a more formal notation
P   traversing a structure in each state all actions are permitted
that extend a prex of a trace of  to a prex of a trace of 
 
Each point in a model where a nondeterministic atomic action appears represents a point where choice
is forced upon the agent from the outside

We could dene such a semantics if we would for instance use tree automata for our action language


P   for all s

i
on all  holds
V
afa
 
 
i
j pre
i

 
  pre
i
g
P a
F   traversing a structure there is a state where one of the actions
that extends a prex of a trace of  to a prex of a trace of  is
forbidden
F   there is an s

i
on a  for which
W
afa
 
 
i
j pre
i

 
  pre
i
g
F a
Note that this characterization is a specialization of the earlier one
   Obligation
In this section we are concerned with the characterization of instantaneous obligations This
notion contrasts with the notion of obligation in the work of Maibaum 		 Maibaum argues
We say that obligations are incurred or discharged which indicates that they only hold during
execution He observes that this contrasts with permissions and prohibitions which are
thought to last after a permitted execution has terminated However nothing is said about
at what point during an execution obligations have to be discharged Following Maibaums
line of thought the only answer to this question seems at some unspecied time in the
future But we believe that this slightly undermines the meaning of what it is to have an
obligation A some time in future obligation can not really be an obligation as long as the
term some time is not made concrete Indeed if we do not quantify the temporal aspect
of the assertion the obligation is void since at any moment in any future course of events
we can postpone the obligation to yet another future point The notion of obligation we
formalize is concerned with reasoning about instantaneous obligations obligations that have
to be discharged immediately by performing a sequence of actions beginning now


We start with the rough intuition
O  it is obliged to choose from the traces of  and perform one
But again we have to become more precise As for permission and prohibition we give a
precise characterization in words and in more formal terms The characterization also reveals
the connection with prohibition
Denition  Semantic characterization of the notion O both in words and in a more
formal notation
O  traversing a structure in each state it is forbidden to perform
actions that extend a strict prex of traces of  to a trace that is not
a prex of a trace of 
O  for all s

i
on all  such that s

i
 s

 
n
for some 
 
 with
length
 
  n holds
V
aAnfa
 
  
i
j pre
i

  
  pre
i
g
F a

The notion of obligation concerned by Maibaum can actually be expressed using our notion together
with the temporal logic expresssivity of the  calculus see section 

Two dierences with the characterization for permission in section 	 attract attention
First in each state of a trace there is no reference to the actions that keep us within the
trace set of  but to the actions that would bring us outside it these actions are forbidden
Given both characterizations it is not too dicult to see that if O holds for any program

 
other than  the property F 
 
 holds So also on the program level we obey the deontic
principle that being obliged equals being forbidden not to

 Second this condition is not
imposed on all states of traces but only on states that are not the nal state of a trace of 
alternatively which are on strict prexes of traces of  The reason is that otherwise the
obligation to perform actions could possibly never be discharged in some cases whenever

is the nal connective in a regular action we would be obliged to go on forever Take
as an example Ob a

 The trace set is b ba baa baaa    Now if in states that are the
nal state of one of these traces we would be obliged to do an action that keeps us within
this set we would always be forced to jump to longer traces by doing an extra a This
obligation would hold forever and we would be caught in an aloop

 By demanding that
only on prenal states we are forbidden to do actions that bring us out of the trace set we
allow for the possibility to do an escaping action in the nal state The justifying intuition
is that in that case we have fullled our obligation since we have performed one of the traces
of  And if we have fullled the obligation we should not any longer be constrained in the
performance of actions

 This semantic choice implies that Oa

   for any atomic action
a and Oskip   since we can comply with these obligations by performing nothing
which is always possible
Having characterized permission prohibition and obligation as conditions on labeled
Kripke structures in sections 
 and  we look for  calculus formulas that enforce equiv
alent conditions on this type of structures But rst we introduce the modal  calculus and
propositional dynamic logic
 The modal  
a
calculus
Informally the modal  calculus can be described as modal logic the weakest form with
out reexivity symmetry or transitivity extended with a minimal and a maximal xpoint
operator The xpoint operators in combination with the standard modal logic operators
h i and  

 enable the expression of a wide range of temporal and dynamic properties
The  calculus is known to subsume among others the temporal logics CTL LTL CTL
ACTL ECTL 	 and propositional dynamic logic PDL   When we talk of the
 calculus we refer to the nonparameterized temporal calculus In this section the modal

Note that we do not speak of 

as the negation of  This is because 

is just one of the actions unequal
to  not the action unequal to 

It would not be possible to satisfy this principle if we would have chosen a weaker notion of permission
Consequently the notion of prohibition would have become stronger too strong to relate the notion of
obligation to it

For permission it poses no problem to be permitted to perform an a innitely often If in case of a
permission we are in the nal state of a permitted trace and it is possible to extend it to another permitted
trace we actually should be permitted to go on

Note that the fulllment of an obligation does not cause an obligation to stop

These operators should not be understood as deontic oparators Throughout the paper they will be
parameterized with respect to atomic actions and should be understood as action operators

 a
calculus 	 is introduced whose modalities are parameterized with respect to actions
a We also occasionally talk about the modal  
m
calculus 	 which is the calculus whose
modalities are parameterized with respect to sets of actions m
 Syntax and Semantics
Denition 	 Given a set A of action symbols and a  A a set P of proposition symbols
and p  P and a set Z of stateset variables
	
and Z  Z a well formed formula  of the
language L is dened through the following BNF
    p j Z j  j  j  j  
 	 j hai j  Z 
The following syntactic abbreviations are applied  
 	 to  	 	 hai to a

	 to  	  			   to  	 A stateset variable Z  Z is a syntactical aid
for constructing formulas that are interpreted through xed points A variable Z is a symbol
that will not be given an independent domain interpretation like p nor will it be given a
logical interpretation like 	 Stateset variables from Z are introduced as subformulas of
general well formed formulas  to be able to view a formula  as a function Z   
S
 
S
on sets of states which in turn makes it possible to dene the semantics of  Z Z as
a minimal xpoint a minimal set of states Z such that Z  Z of this function We
apply the usual restriction that the state variable Z only appears within the scope of an
even number of negations in bounded formulas This might seem a severe restriction on the
syntax But the restriction is only on negations that are in the scope of xpoint operators
and is actually required for having solutions to the xpoint semantics that is responsible for
the expressive power of the  calculus The restriction guarantees monotonicity of functions
Z   
S
 
S
 which in turn guarantees a solution to the xed point equation Z  Z
After this short look ahead into the semantics of the modal  
a
calculus we now give the
formal description of it After that we elaborate on how a xed point  
a
calculus formula
can best be read
To dene the semantics of arbitrary well formed formulas we use the structures of def
inition 	 where for the moment the deontic valuation function  is replaced by a general
valuation function 
 that interprets general proposition symbols P The semantics is dened
by extending the valuation function 
   P  
S
to the interpretation function jjjj

  L  
S

which depends on a function    Z  
S
that interprets stateset variables possibly present
in  From this it follows that we can view an interpretation jjjj

of a formula  containing
Z as a subformula as a function from states Z to states jjjj

 If we want to make this
function explicit we write Z jjjj

 


Denition 
 Given a structure S  S 
 R
A
 the interpretation jjjj

of a w  on a
structure S relative to an interpretation of statevariables  not xed for a structure is
dened by
	
Usually these are called state variables But we feel that stateset variable is more appropriate since
the variables range over sets of states
 

This is just a more accurate notation for the above used  Z

jjjj

 S
jjjj

 
jjpjj

 
p
jjZjj

 Z
jj 
 
 
jj

 jjjj

 jj
 
jj

jjjj

 S n jjjj

jjhaijj

 fs  S j s
 
 S such that s s
 
  R
a
and s
 
 jjjj

g
jj Zjj

 the least xed point of the function Z jjjj

jjZjj

 the greatest xed point of the function Z jjjj

A superscript S in the interpretation function jjjj

is omitted leaving implicit that in
terpretations of formulas depend on the structure they are evaluated on
  
A formula  is
dened to be valid on a structure S  S 
 R
A
 if and only if jjjj

 S  and a formula is
valid if it is valid on all possible structures
We now try to give an intuitive reading of  calculus formulas This reading facilitates the
understanding of  calculus formulas in general and in particular the denition of deontic
notions for regular actions in section  We call this reading of  calculus formulas repetitive
reading  As an example take the formula  Z  
 haiZ Now repetitive reading refers to
looking at this formula as if it reads  
 hai 
 hai 
 hai   So we read the formula
as if at the place where a variable Z appears the subformula that is bounded by  Z is
repeated But we have to be more specic about the meaning of the three dots In case of
binding by a   the dots mean arbitrary but nite repetition and satisfying a  formula
means satisfying at least one of the nitely repeated readings of the formula
 
 In case of
binding by a  the dots mean innite repetition and satisfying a formula means satisfying
the complete innitely expanded formula
 
 In general  formulas can be used to describe
properties of terminating nite behavior and formulas can be used to describe properties
of nonterminating innite behavior
  The  
a
calculus translation of Propositional Dynamic Logic
We now turn to the denition of propositional dynamic logic as a translation to the  
a

calculus In the next section we need this translation in the compositional  
a
calculus char
acterizations for permission and prohibition
Denition  Given a set P of proposition symbols a well formed formula  of PDL with
 a regular action and p  P is dened as follows
  
Due to Tarski 
 the denition of the least xed point  Z  of the monotonic function Z jjjj
 
can
be written as
T
fZ  S j Z jjjj
 
 Zg In the denition of the semantics we prefer just to write the least
xed point of the function Z jjjj
 
 because the characterization due to Tarski is less intuitive
 
This reading is justied by the  calculus property  Z  Z            This property
assumes continuity of  Z which is always obeyed on structures where states have a nite number of
successors
 
This reading is justied by the  calculus properties Z  Z            assuming 
continuity and            from the monotonicity of  Z that together imply Z  Z 
          where the dots are thought to represent nonniteness Monotonicity also implies  
        but this is of no use in the simplication of the reading of  Z 

    p j  j  j  j  	 	 j 
The semantics of  is that  holds at the end of all traces that interpret  The
semantics of the dual hi is that there is trace in the interpretation of  that ends in a
state where  holds This semantics is easily dened through a syntactic translation f to the
 
a
calculus 
Denition  The  
a
calculus translation of PDL
fP   P fZ  Z
f 	 
 
  f 	 f
 
 f  f
fa  af f    f 	 f
f

  Z f 	 fZ f   f
fhskipi  f fskip  f
Note that also stateset variables occur in the translation This is because they may
appear as the result of translating formulas like a

 With the help of repetitive reading it
is easy to check that the formula ha

i which translates the formula  Z  
 haiZ refers to
all states in a model where by a nite number of executions of a we reach a state where 
holds and that a

 which translates to Z  	 aZ means that  has to hold after any
number of executions of a
 Compositional characterizations in the  
a
calculus
From now on we assume that the  
a
calculus syntax of denition  is extended to include
regular actions denition 	 and formulas P  F  and O
 Permission and Prohibition
We now dene  
a
calculus
 
validities that are sound and complete with respect to the
semantic characterization given in section 	
Proposition  The following are validities sound and complete with respect to the semantic
characterization of denition 	
P skip   F skip  
P 
 
  P  	 P 
 
 F 
 
  F  
 hiF 
 

P   
 
  P  	 P 
 
 F   
 
  F  
 F 
 

P 

  Z P  	 Z F 

   Z F  
 hiZ
 
This semantics can not be captured in CTL  because CTL lacks actions and the possibility to assert
what holds along the way

Note that xpoint formulas only appear in the decomposition of P 

 and F 

 In
several decompositions formulas of the form  and hi appear which for a further de
composition rely on the  
a
calculus translation of PDL from section 
Sketch of a proof
Soundness of P 
 
  P  	 P 
 
 we prove that this formula holds given that
for the traces of P 
 
 P  and P 
 
 the conditions of denition  hold The rst
observation is that the traces of 
 
are concatenations of traces from 
 
to traces of  Now
recall from section  that  means that  holds after all traces in  So as the formula
P  on the right hand side imposes the right condition on the rst part of concatenations
the formula P 
 
 imposes the right condition on the second part The only state that
deserves closer attention is the point of concatenation since in this point we might not satisfy
the condition that actions from other traces with the same prex are also permitted But
again recalling the semantics of the PDLexpression  in terms of traces P 
 
 states
that traces of 
 
that have equal prexes in  all have to obey the same permission
property P 
 
 after the performance of  So the validity actually reects the total free
choice semantics It is illustrative to verify this for the example structures for P a b  c
given above The validity decomposes P a b  c into P a 	 aP b  c The right hand
side states that in both traces ab and ac after a is performed the permission property P bc
must hold This is only the case for the right model the one that corresponds to the total
free choice semantics
Soundness of P   
 
  P  	 P 
 
 similar
Soundness of P 

  Z P  	 Z similar
Completeness to prove completeness we have to go the other way given the validities
we have to prove that all the right conditions on traces are imposed The validities together
with the  
a
calculus expressions for PDL of denition  can be used to break down any
formula P  and F  into formulas with only atomic deontic formulas of the form P a
and F a Given the soundness of the validities this can be used to prove that on all states
the conditions as stated in denition  are imposed
  Obligation
It would be nice to have similar compositional  
a
calculus characterizations for the notion of
obligation of a regular action But the following conjecture contradicts this prospect
Conjecture  For obligation we cannot dene the semantics compositionally for   and



First of all we claim that O  
 
 is not likely to be expressible in terms of O and
O
 
 This is already seen at the atomic level The semantic characterization of section 
denes Oa  b as
V
xAnfabg
F x and Oa as
V
xAnfag
F x and Ob as
V
xAnfbg
F x From
this it follows that Oa 
 Ob  Oa  b and obviously we also have Oa 	 Ob 
Oa 
 Ob It is easily seen that the semantic characterization does not allow that the
implications are reversed So the expression we look for a decomposition Oa b must be
even weaker than Oa
Ob but yet compositional in Oa and Ob This seems impossible
	
To show the noncompositionality of O

 we look at the example Oa b

 A  
a

calculus expression
 
capturing exactly the semantic characterization of section  is Z aOb	
bZ This is not likely to be equivalent to a notion that is functional in Oa b which is
identied with Oa	 aOb because Z aOb	 bZ does not contain any information
equivalent with Oa
Finally we argue that O


 
 is not expressible in terms of O

 and 

O
 
 Again
we only look at the atomic case Oa

 b is not expressible in terms of Oa

 and a

Ob  
a

calculus formulas corresponding to the characterization of section  are Z Oa b	 aZ
 and Z Ob 	 aZ We cannot express the rst of these formulas in terms of the
other two because Oa b cannot be broken down in Oa and Ob as was just shown
Furthermore if we could break down Oa b the formulas would still be incomparable
because obligations concerning the atomic action a are completely absent in the second two
formulas However this is only a counterexample that proves the noncompositionality with
respect to the compound operation 

 Indeed for regular actions in which the  is never
preceded by a

 we can prove that O
 
  O 	 O
 
 holds
Summarizing we may say that the noncompositionality with respect to the regular action
syntax has two main causes The rst one is simply that obligation of free choice is not
compositional The second one is that obligation of iteration is noncompositional which is
caused by the fact that we can comply with an obligation concerning an iteration by doing
nothing This relates to the absence of atomic obligations in the nal states of traces as
discussed before
Note that we do not claim that obligation is not compositional The composition is just
more complex and recursive in the structure of deterministic nite automatons corresponding
to a regular action In the next section we show how this works The form of compositionality
involved we call weak compositionality
 Weakly compositional  
a
calculus characterizations
through DFAs
We now turn to an alternative  
a
calculus characterization of deontic notions that does not
aim at compositionality with respect to regular action connectives but that constitutes a re
cursive composition from atomic deontic notions governed by the structure of deterministic
nite automatons of a regular action We show that the notion of obligation as dened in
section  can be captured in the  
a
calculus in this way But rst we dene weakly compo
sitional characterizations for permission and prohibition and show that they are equivalent
to the compositional characterization of section 
	
 Permission and Prohibition
We rst dene the deontic notions for atomic choice actions m which are sets of atomic
actions We call an element m  
A
a choice action because we interpret m as a non
deterministic choice between the atomic actions in m If m  fa bg we write for instance
P m as P a b
 
Here we anticipate on the characterization in section 
		
Denition  The denition of the deontic notions P m and F m for atomic choice actions
m
P m 
V
am
P a F m  P m
Clearly these denitions are compatible with the denition of P   
 
 and F   
 

given in 	 The rst step in the alternative  
a
calculus denition of deontic notions of
regular actions is to associate a regular action with a deterministic nite automaton DFA
that describes the same set of traces The second step is to express the semantics of P 
and F  completely in terms of the semantics of P m and F m by building a  
a
calculus
formula based on the DFA There is always more than one DFA for a given regular action
but we prove that  
a
calculus translations of dierent DFAs of the same regular action are
logically equivalent To get a rst impression of this approach two initial examples are given
Example  The properties P a

 b and P a b



 c

DFAs of the regular actions a

 b and a b



 c
a
b
a
a
b
c
c
The property P a

 b expressed in terms of P a b by means of a  
a
calculus formula
Z P a b	aZ
 In words the permission to perform the action a

 b equals the permission
to initially choose between the atomic actions a and b and if a is chosen to reach this same
deontic state again

The property P a b



 c expressed in terms of P a b c and P a c by means of a  
a

calculus formula P a c 	 aZ P a b c 	 aZ 	 bZ
 

 In words the permission to
perform the action P a b



 c equals the permission to initially choose between the atomic
actions a and c and if a is chosen to reach a state where one is permitted to choose between
the atomic actions a b and c and where if one chooses either an a or a b one reaches the
same deontic state again

The examples show that the  
a
calculus formula expressing the deontic notion is related
directly to the automaton We now give the precise denition of how the formula is built
First the notions of well founded loop and return state for DFAs are dened
Denition  A wellfounded loop of a deterministic nite automaton DFA  SAN s
i
 T 
with S a set of states A a set of actions N   S  A S the transition function s
i
 S the
initial state and T  S the set of terminal states is a sequence of edges e
 
 e

     e
n
e
i
 E
and E  S  A S such that
 
Note that in this example the description of the regular action does not contain the choice operator 	 but
that in the  
a
calculus translation to permissions concerning atomic actions many nondeterministic choices
appear This is the nondeterminism that in the action description is part of the semantics of the iteration
	
 e
 
leaves the initial state
 each e
i
leaves the state that is entered by e
i 
 there is an e
i
with i  n such that e
i
and e
n
enter the same state
 there is no other pair of edges e
j
and e
k
that enter the same state
A state that is entered by the nal edge e
n
of a wellfounded loop is called a return state

In the following the set of return states of a DFA is denoted by R

Proposition  Given a deterministic nite automaton there are nitely many wellfounded
loops and each wellfounded loop is of nite length

Proof
From negative demonstration an innite number of wellfounded loops can only be real
ized with an innite number of edges and thus with an innite automaton and a wellfounded
loop of innite length can only be realized with an innite number of edges in combination
with an innite number of states since in a wellfounded loop we cannot visit a state for the
second time the only exception is the return state at the end of a loop but there the loop
ends
In general there are many wellfounded loops and many return states of these loops
coincide In the procedure dened next the procedure that builds a  
a
calculus formula
from a given deterministic nite state machine each state that is the return state of one or
more wellfounded loops is assigned a separate  
a
calculus state variable
Denition  Let  be a regular action and M

 SAN s
i
 T  a corresponding deter
ministic nite automaton with S a set of states A a set of actions N   S  A  S the
transition function s
i
 S the initial state and T  S the set of terminal states
 Further
more let R  S be the set of return states of the DFA let Z
s
be a state variable associated
with a return state s  R and let outs be the outgoing automaton actions of a state s  S

Then a  
a
calculus formula representing the semantics of the deontic notion P  is built with
the help of a recursive mapping f that associates a  
a
calculus formula to each automaton
state
if s  S nR fs  P outs 	
V
aouts
afNs a
if s  R fs  Z
s
 P outs 	
V
aouts
afNs a
if s  R f
 
s  Z
s
A return state s  R has two associated formulas fs and f
 
s
 The value fs is
used if in a thread of recursive calls of the function the return state s is visited for the rst
time and the value f
 
s is used if in this same thread the state is returned to visited for
the second time
 If automaton states have no outgoing actions their associated formula is

 The semantics of P  is dened as the formula associated to the initial state of the
automaton P   fs
i


	
The reader is invited to check that this recursive procedure applied to the deontic notions
of example 	 returns the correct  
a
calculus formulas For the notion F  we can dene a
separate recursive mapping with 
 instead of 	 h i instead of   and   instead of  But
this is equivalent to dening F  as P 
Proposition  The recursive mapping f in denition  always returns a nite wellformed
 
a
calculus formula

Proof
Each thread of recursive calls either follows a wellfounded loop through the automaton
or ends in an endstate of the automaton Since the automaton contains only nitely many
wellfounded loops and since the loops are of nite length the recursive calls eventually stop
The wellformedness is straightforward given the denition of the mapping f 
A regular action is equivalent with many dierent DFAs The following proposition states
that nevertheless the semantics as dened by denition 		 is preserving
Proposition   
a
calculus translations of dierent DFAs describing the same set of traces
are logically equivalent

Sketch of a proof
We do not prove this formally but reveal the intuition behind the proof From automaton
theory it is known that for any DFA and even FA there is a unique minimal DFA MDFA
that describes the same trace set and that DFAs dier from the MDFA only in the sense
that some MDFAstates have equivalent copies The recursive function of denition 		 is not
able to distinguish between DFAs that only dier in the sense that certain states have copies
This is illustrated by a small example 
a
b
b
a a
a
a
b
a
a
b
Both the DFAs of the example represent the trace set faaa abag The right DFA is
minimal The left DFA contains copies of the end and beforeend state of the minimal DFA
This is a very simple example of copies of automaton states In general also return states
can be copied which may lead to DFAs that are not easily recognizable as equivalent to
the minimal one It is not dicult to see that for both DFAs the mapping f of denition
		 returns exactly the same  
a
calculus formula When copies of return states are involved
 
a
calculus formulas may dier in the names of stateset variables Z
s
with s  R But clearly
this does not have any inuence on the logical content of the formula
We now turn to the claim that both explored  
a
calculus characterizations of the notions
of permission and prohibition are equivalent In the following we denote the initial state s
i
of a deterministic nite automaton M

corresponding to a regular action  by s
i
M


	

Theorem 	 The notions P  and F  of proposition  and denition  are equivalent

Sketch of a proof
We prove this by showing that this second translation into the  
a
calculus is also sound
and complete with respect to the semantic characterization of denition  To prove sound
ness we have to prove that on structures for which the conditions for P  of denition 
hold the formula fs
i
M

 is valid Now traces of  can be seen as arbitrary but nite
paths from begin to end state inM

 and dierent traces of  with a common prex initially
follow the same path in M

 because M

is deterministic
 
 Now the conditions on traces
as stated in denition  demand that in each state the next action of a trace and all next
actions of traces with an identical prex are permitted The subformulas P outs and the
construction of fs
i
M

 exactly guarantee this
To prove completeness we have to prove that the formula fs
i
M

 imposes the condi
tions of denition  on traces This is seen directly from the construction of fs
i
M


  Obligations permissions and prohibitions contrary to a prohi
bition
An important feature of deontic logics is their capacity to assert properties that say what
should hold when a norm is actually violated In this logic these contrary to duty notions can
be dealt with very well In case of violation of a prohibition such properties typically have
the form F  	  In this formula F  says that  is forbidden and  says that 
holds if this prohibition is violated The formula  can of course express a new prohibition
a permission an obligation or any other  
a
calculus property
 Obligation
First we give the denitions of the characterization through automatons Then we show
that this characterization is equivalent to the semantic characterization of obligation given
in section 
Denition  The denition of the deontic notion Om for atomic choice actions m
Om 
V
aAnm
P a
Note that for atomic actions a and b it follows that Oa 
 Ob  Oa b This form
of Rosss anomaly only resides on this atomic level and can actually be easily avoided by
demanding that Om also means that for all actions a in m the property P a holds
Denition  Let  be a regular action and M

 SAN s
i
 T  a corresponding deter
ministic nite automaton with S a set of states A a set of actions N   S  A  S the
transition function s
i
 S the initial state and T  S the set of terminal states
 Further
more let R  S be the set of return states of the DFA let Z
s
be a state variable associated
 
This shows why we need DFAs for the  
a
calculus translation and not NDFAs
	
with the return state s  R and let outs be the outgoing automaton actions of a state
s  S
 Then a  
a
calculus formula representing the semantics of the deontic notion O
is built with the help of a recursive mapping f that associates a  
a
calculus formula to each
automaton state
if s  S n R  T  fs  Oouts 	
V
aouts
afNs a
if s  R n T  fs  Z
s
 Oouts 	
V
aouts
afNs a
if s  T nR fs 
V
aouts
afNs a
if s  R  T  fs  Z
s

V
aouts
afNs a
if s  R f
 
s  Z
s
The distinction between primed and unprimed values equals that in denition 
 The
semantics of O is dened as the formula associated to the initial state of the automaton
O  fs
i


The dierences with the denition of the mapping f for permission follow directly from
the semantic choices discussed in section  First on the level of atomic actions we have of
course Oouts instead of P outs Second the nal states s  T are treated seperataly
in denitions of fs for states s  T nR and s  RT  The dierence with the denition of
fs in the nonterminal states s  S n R  T  and s  R n T is that the atomic obligations
Oouts are left out which corresponds to the semantic choice that in the nal states of
traces terminal states in the automatons no atomic obligations should hold
Theorem 
 The translation O  fs
i
M

 is sound and complete with respect to the
semantic characterization of denition 

Sketch of a proof
The proof of the soundness and completeness is similar to that for P  and follows from
the correspondence of the semantic characterization in terms of traces and the structure of
automatons seen as canonical structures for O
We conclude this section with two examples
Example  The properties Oa b

 and Oa  b

 b a

DFAs of the regular actions a b

and a  b

 b a
a
a
b
b
a
b
a
b
The  
a
calculus expression for Oa b

 is Z aOb 	 bZ
 Note that Oa b

 
Oa while for permission P a b

  P a
 Again this shows the dierence between
permission and obligation with respect to atomic notions holding in nal states of traces

	
The  
a
calculus expression for Oa  b

 b a is Z Oa b 	 aZ 	 bY Oa b 	
bY 	 abY 	 aZ
 This example shows that it is not always straightforward to recognize
that a regular action and a DFA describe the same set of traces
 Consequently a  
a
calculus
expression is not always easily recognized as describing a certain deontic notion of a regular
action

 Obligations permissions and prohibitions contrary to an obli
gation
In the logic also the contrary to duty notion with respect to an obligation can be dealt with
very well These properties typically have the form O 	  In this formula O says
that  is obliged and  says that  holds or should be done if this obligation is violated
But we did not yet dene the notion of regular action negation used in this formula The
semantics of  is that  holds after every atomic action that brings us outside the trace
set of  Again we can capture this notion in a construction with nite automatons We
can simply replace all appearances of Oouts in denition 	
 with outs where the
notation m denotes the complement A nm of a set of actions m This ensures that in each
automaton after any of the actions not among the actions leaving that automaton state 
holds Allowing expressions like m means that we have to generalize the  
a
calculus we
used so far to the  
m
calculus as used by Stirling et al 	
 Discussion
We dened a deontic logic for regular actions as a mapping to the modal  
a
calculus Meyer
	
 earlier studied the deontic notions of nondeterministic choice sequence and parallel
execution of actions Meyers main idea is to introduce an action algebra containing negation
within the box of modal logic Since Meyer does not consider iteration we can only compare
our present logic with his on choice and sequence We take the example Oa b  c d
In our present semantics this property is identied with the intuitively strongly appealing
Oac	aOb	cOd
 
 whereas in Meyers logic no simple identication is possible This
is in favor of the argument that our present semantics provides a more intuitive formalization
of the combined deontic notions for sequence and choice
Van der Meyden 	 denes two notions of permission for regular actions one that corre
sponds to free choice permission and one he calls not forbidden His free choice permission

X aims at the formalization of the same notion as our permission does The only
dierence is that Van der Meydens notion of free choice permission for regular actions en
forces termination of executions by demanding traces to end in states where X holds But
if we substitute  for X in Van der Meydens complete axiomatization we see that our
formalization of permission is equivalent to his
 	
 the validities of proposition 	 are easily
seen to be the  
a
calculus equivalents of Van der Meydens axioms for 
 The reasons
we redened Van der Meydens notion of permission here are that we wanted to reveal the
connection with  
a
calculus and nite automatons that Van der Meyden leaves undiscussed
 
For this simple property the strength of the  
a
calculus is clearly superuous
 	
If we perform this substitution in the description of the semantics the equivalence is less clear
	
the semantic choice between partially imposed and total free choice that we wanted to show
that the semantics of this notion can be dened without labeling actions as forbidden or
permitted as deemed necessary by Van der Meyden and that we wanted to show the dif
ferences with the  
a
calculus denitions for obligation Van der Meyden does not deal with
obligation
The reduction to  
a
calculus has many advantages First of all the modal  
a
calculus
is decidable Second a complete axiomatization for the  
a
calculus is known 	 Third
much research on  calculus is already undertaken or on its way including work on clausal
resolution procedures for the modal  calculus Fourth there are several model checkers
available for both the standard  calculus 	 and for the  
a
calculus 	 Fifth since
in the  calculus a wide range of temporal logics is expressible CTL LTL CTL ACTL
ECTL etc	 we get for free a mixture of deontic and temporal notions We can express
on all paths it globally holds that some time in the future it is obliged to perform the action
a b

 as using CTL  G F Oa b

 and using the  
a
calculus X YZOa 	
aOb	 bZ 
 anyY 	 anyX This type of properties is reminiscent of the obligation
properties dened by Maibaum 		 as discussed in section 
Only in section  we mentioned one of the famous anomalies that have plagued many
deontic systems Rosss anomaly But we allready pointed out how to avoid the anomaly on
the atomic level And it is not dicult to see that on the level of regular actions we allready
avoid Rosss anomaly so O  O  
 
 It might be clear that we are also not subject
to the freechoice anomaly since we have formalized a notion of free choice permission
We hope to explore extensions to concurrent actions and how the extensions of the
framework allowing such actions fair in the face of paradoxes associated with such actions
such as the penitents anomaly the gentle murderer anomaly and one of the readings of the
Chisholm anomaly


 Furthermore we want to investigate the addition of extra program
components to the action language such as test Finally we plan to investigate to what
extent the DFAs we associated with deontic notions can be used as canonical structures to
model check properties on This might provide a partial replacement of theorem proving by
model checking for this logic
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